Home > Q&A > Special Guest: Jihadica’s Thomas Hegghammer

Special Guest: Jihadica’s Thomas Hegghammer

April 15th, 2009
This jihadist graphic depicts an Islamic flag stabbed into the heart of Italy. Hundreds like it litter the Internet. (CTC-West Point)

This jihadist graphic depicts an Islamic flag stabbed into the heart of Italy. Hundreds like it litter the Internet. (CTC-West Point)

Today we are pleased to host Thomas Hegghammer, contributor to Jihadica. The Norwegian-born scholar is a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He joins us to share his thoughts on the study of radical Islam and its relation to Saudi Arabia and Afpak.

1. SITE Intelligence Group, Jihad Watch — where does Jihadica fit into the mix?

First, Jihadica is a very small, pro bono operation, while SITE is a professional and fee-based service. Second, Jihadica is not a translation service and we do not aim for comprehensive monitoring in the way SITE does. Instead, we offer informed commentary on selected items and topics. Finally, we aim for more politically neutral coverage than sites such as Jihad Watch, which have a very explicit anti-Islamist agenda.

2. To what extent is the jihadist threat over-hyped or under-appreciated?

I think it is fair to say that it was underestimated before 9/11 and hyped after 9/11. Today I think we have reached a fairly sensible equilibrium, as we have accumulated more knowledge about terrorism and the emotional outrage over 9/11 has dissipated. The problem is that it would only take one major operation in the US or Europe for people to get emotional about terrorism again.

3. Many commentators have urged renewed focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, arguing that all roads lead to that region. To what extent is this true, in the context of the literature/movement you are studying?

The focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan is entirely justified, because al-Qaida Central is based here. Access to a territory arguably increases a terrorist group’s capability more than any other factor, because it allows for training, which is crucial for operationalising intentions. If al-Qaida Central is allowed a safe haven, there will undoubtedly be more attacks on the US homeland. The problem, however, is that the current focus on “AfPak” comes too late. We should have done this in 2002, but President Bush chose to invade Iraq instead.

Are the Saudi royals in charge? (Mohamed Messara/EPA)

Are the Saudi royals in charge? (Mohamed Messara/EPA)

4. You are the author of a forthcoming work, Jihad in Saudi Arabia. How should Americans think about the Kingdom? Ally or foe, stable or unstable — what makes it tick?

Three important facts about the Kingdom are counterintuitive to most people. First, Saudi Arabia is one of the most stable regimes in the Middle East. It has an unelected government and unsavoury laws on social and moral matters, but there is no organized political opposition. Second, Saudi Arabia is not a very repressive state by Middle Eastern standards. It is authoritarian, but it uses much less physical repression to control its population politically than most of the Arab republics. The really nasty police states are countries like Tunisia, Syria, Libya and Egypt. Third, there is no Wahhabi Comintern. The Saudi Islamist community is not in any way controlled by the government or the religious establishment. Saudi support for militant groups abroad has nearly always been bottom-up, not top-down.

5. The struggle with radical Islam has often been compared to the Cold War: long-term ideological conflict. Yet the national resources that we arrayed against the Soviets seem paltry in comparison to those deployed towards understanding the Islamic world. What do you make of this?

My knowledge of American politics during the Cold War is not deep enough to make a qualified comparison. However, I am not sure the resources deployed to understand the Islamic world since 9/11 are really that impressive, particularly compared to the money spent on hard counterterrorism. Yes, there are many more books and a few more research centers, but overall, academia has received only a tiny portion of the money spent in the war on terror. A professor costs much less than a soldier (let alone a private contractor), yet the number of American professors specialising in militant Islamism probably does not exceed 50. I should say that the academy itself is also partly to blame for this, because it has tended to look down upon the study of terrorism and jihadism. To my knowledge, none of the Ivy League universities today have a tenured professor whose main focus is terrorism.

Tristan Abbey Q&A

  1. No comments yet.
Comments are closed.