Europe Should Have Appeased in 1931
Germany and "Ostmark" were willing to work within the status quo framework in 1931
Supplementing Scott’s fine analysis of the “Munich paradigm” from yesterday, I want to briefly consider the proper scope of appeasement in interwar Europe. Specifically, while Scott is correct in identifying 1935—and not 1938—as the point of no return for reigning in a militarized Nazi Germany, I suggest on a different front that too little was done to mollify Germany in 1931—I claim that in the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision to block the Austro-German Customs Union laid out in the Protocol of March 19th, 1931, the European community exercised its authority in an unnecessarily punitive way.
Morgenthau clarifies that robust imperialism undercuts the status quo conscientiously
Before evaluating the details of the PCIJ’s advisory opinion, it is first important to clarify my understanding of how appeasement interrelates with imperialism. Standard studies of Hitlerian Germany correctly argue that Chamberlain’s weakness at Munich was uniformly damaging, but they often extend this logic to write off all concessions made to Germany through the 20s and 30s as being ultimately harmful for the way the precipitated a well-armed Third Reich. To this, I suggest that Hans Morgenthau’s definition of imperialism in his classic “Politics Among Nations” is instructive—Imperialism is that course of policy undertaken by a state that seeks to recreate the political status quo. This element, the concerted undermining of the existing order, fits critically into any analysis of interwar Germany. The rearmament of the Rhineland qualifies as an overtly imperialistic act. The annexation of the Sudetenland fits the bill as well. While the picture is a murky one difficult to see for the narrative force of subsequent history, I emphasize that Weimar Germany’s desire to form a customs union with Austria was not intended to be the first step in Anschluss. Rather, when we consider the proposed economic pact in light of the Young Plan, we see firm evidence that Germany and Austria were actively trying to uphold Locarno norms by formulating a method to meet the steep repayment burdens imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. As Morgenthau puts it:
[German foreign policy from 1919 to 1935] did not openly challenge the power relations established by the Treaty of Versailles; rather it aimed at adjustments that left their essence intact. Such was the character of the ‘policy of fulfillment’—that is, fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles—which the Republic of Weimar pursued. It was this attempt to improve the international position of Germany while accepting…the status quo of Versailles that aroused the violent opposition of nationalists and National Socialists (“Politics Among Nations”, p. 51-52).
"For Three Generations You'll Have to Slave Away!" -- Popular outcry against the Young Plan prompted out-of-the-box thinking on how to incubate economic recovery.
In the years following the implementation of the Dawes Plan in 1924, it quickly became apparent that Germany would not be able to meet its reparation obligations to the allied powers. The Young Plan in 1929 was drafted by the Morgan bank to reorganize Germany’s debt burden into a non-negotiable sum equivalent to one third of the total load and a portion that could be postponed to account for later developments. In its conduct, we can assume that the Weimar government found this new arrangement agreeable enough—had the Crash of 1929 not knocked the global economy off its axis, the immediate tensions that compelled Germany to seek a customs union may never have developed. A moratorium was placed on payments for a time after the crash—that the Weimar government sought a customs union during this period further demonstrates its readiness to comply with the international order of the day.
The Protocol of March 19th, 1931 forming a free trade union between Austria and Germany was contended on the grounds that it violated the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain coupled with a separate 1922 Geneva Treaty. Within the Saint Germain Treaty, controversy revolved around Article 88:
The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.
Within the Geneva Treaty, arguments centered on Protocol No. 1:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Austria…Undertakes, in accordance with the terms of Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, not to alienate its independence; it will abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence…This undertaking shall not prevent Austria from maintaining, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, her freedom in the matter of customs tariffs and commercial or financial agreements, and, in general, in all matters relating to her economic regime or her commercial relations, provided always that she shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any State a special regime or exclusive advantages calculated to threaten this independence.
As is easily anticipated, the majority of deliberation centered on the issue of whether the customs union comprised a “special regime” yielding exclusive advantages to Germany. On this matter, eight of the fifteen judges decided that this was unavoidably the case despite that Art 1., No. 2 of the Austro-German protocol arranged a clear path of entry for third-party states. This “contingency” to the existed state of the pact was considered irrelevant to the proceedings and the advisory opinion correspondingly struck down the protocol on the basis that one aspect of it was configured bilaterally—if only temporarily.
In the halls of the Hague's Peace Palace, Europe sealed its fate
The majority opinion was misguided in its appraisal of the customs union, and it was at fault for striking down the protocol for a part of its text that was still evolving. Dionisio Anzilotti’s individual opinion is more measured in its treatment of the customs union, but it reaches the same incorrect conclusion. Essentially, Anzilotti’s argument hinged on the idea that Protocol No. 1 of Geneva merely echoed (imperfectly) legal guidelines already contained in Article 88 of Saint-Germain. In that article, excerpted above, Anzilotti suggests that the court must conceive of Austria’s obligation as an active one—in other words, Austria, in Anzilotti’s formulation, is obligated to ensure fully that no aspect of its action breaks the article prior to entering any arrangement like a customs union. This duty semantically sources from the treaty’s use of “consequently” as an introduction to Austria’s guidelines.
Separate from this, Anzilotti also draws attention to the distinction between the “alienation of independence” and the “compromise of independence”. While the customs union, he agrees, would not alienate independence because Austria would undoubtedly retain its sovereignty, he concludes that “in view of the great disproportion in economic strengths of Germany and Austria…the effect [of a customs union] would therefore be to conform and strengthen the movement toward the incorporation of Austria within a single big German state” (p. 29). This “movement” he alleges union will strengthen is outlined as a series of social forces tending toward nationalism and pan-Germanism—i.e., the “movement” in Anzilotti’s opinion is the collection of those forces that would become National Socialism in 1933. In the act of strengthening bonds between the states, Anzilotti emphasizes that the “compromise of independence” is met.
Dionisio Anzilotti, the individual opinion in the customs union case
Interestingly, Anzilotti then goes on to say that were the union to include a third party state, Austria would not be compromising its independence and that therefore a union could be acceptable even if organized without League of Nations approval. This line of argument is closer to resembling the majority advisory opinion, but in Anzilotti’s view, even negotiations to include a third party would substantiate full enough efforts to preclude the compromise of sovereignty. Erroneously in my view, Anzilotti says that elements of the customs union protocol touching on existing negotiations do not have any bearing on his decision because Protocol No. 1 of the Geneva Treaty itself has no bearing on his decision—the core of the policies forbidding union are outlined in Article 88 and so consideration must not even be extended in light of Geneva.
Anschluss in 1938: Could PCIJ reasonableness in 1931 have prevented this parade?
The PCIJ’s reasoning in the customs union case is fascinating to study in retrospect, but in diving into the nitty gritty of the justices’ opinions, we run the risk of overlooking the central flaw of the whole affair—the legitimate attempts of Austria and Germany to apply their sovereignty within the limitations of the Locarno order were trumped by League of Nations standards preventing such action on the grounds the each nation was forbidden from harming its own sovereignty. Appeasement to German and Austrian interests in this case would not have been harmful because it would not have disrupted the status quo. Moreover, the structure of the proposed customs union was such that if political leaders in the two nations subsequently strayed from the existing norms, clear remedies were available. In denying union in 1931, the League of Nations achieved nothing more than the further radicalization of nationalist movements in each state—to accede would not have been to legitimize pan-German nationalism because at that stage the nationalists still did not possess a seat at the bargaining table. Anzilotti’s opinion regards that it is judging these fringe movements along with the formal government: this interpretation is wrong and damaging. The final word on this subtle point comes from Winston Churchill speaking in the House of Commons in 1950:
The declaration of the Prime Minister that there will be no appeasement commands almost universal support. It is a good slogan for a country. It seems to me however that in this House it requires to be more precisely defined. What we really mean, I think, is no appeasement through weakness or fear… Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.
The voting ballot on the Anschluss measure. The correct answer, evidently, was "Ja".