Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle
By Oleg V. Khlevniuk, translated by Nora Seligman Favorov
Yale University Press, 2009
HC: 344 pages
ISBN-13: 978-0300110661
$38.00 ($30.41 on Amazon, click here)
What the author set out to write was a detailed study from Soviet archives intended to refute a prior theory that Stalin’s rule in the 1930’s involved Stalin as a balance wheel between radical and moderate factions within the Stalinist clique at the top of the party – state apparatus. He makes an excellent case that this was not so. He shows personal alliances across the supposed moderate – radical fault line. He shows that supposed radicals and moderates changed their supposed ideology as they changed positions within the overlapping spheres of state and party bodies governing the Soviet Union. He shows Stalin making a show of leadership by committee long after the internal archives show that no decision of any serious consequences could be made without him, much less in opposition to him. On all of this the author makes a quite convincing case but, as is often the case with archival research, even in far more open societies than Putin’s Russia one should be wary of accepting that any conclusion is truly final until far more decades of archival mining have taken place. All that one can truly say at this point is that the earlier analysis based on memoirs and similar less exacting sources needs new evidence from the archives to again be taken seriously.
Scott Palter Book Reviews
Paul Bremer and Colin Powell in 2003 (Defense Dept)
Paul Bremer led the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from 2003 to 2004. He previously served as chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism, ambassador-at-large for counterrorism, and ambassador to the Netherlands. He joins Bellum for an extended discussion on the war in Afghanistan, the clash of civilizations, and the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
1. Many policy experts, like Ralph Peters, Kori Schake, and others, are voicing grave concerns about continuing the project in Afghanistan. Some have called for a counterterrorism strategy—drones, special forces, etc.—instead of a counterinsurgency strategy—heavy footprint, long-term presence, etc. What are your views on this debate? On our prospects in Afghanistan? On President Obama’s Afghan policy thus far?
Tristan Abbey Articles
John Negroponte (Time/Corbis)
John Negroponte has held numerous positions throughout the federal government, serving as ambassador to Honduras, the United Nations, and Iraq, as well as the Director of National Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of State. He joins Bellum for some brief Q&A.
1. One of the hot issues in political science is the future of the nation-state, with many forecasting its passing in the coming century. As a retired diplomat who represented the most successful nation-state in history, what’s your take?
Tristan Abbey Q&A
BBC's Map
Five hundred people are believed to have been killed so far in violent clashes in the Nigerian city of Jos. BBC explains the complicated religious and ethnic fault lines here:
Some Christian farmers feel they are under threat, as Hausa-speaking Muslims come down from the north looking for pasture for their animals. But any disputes over access to land or power quickly take on a religious dimension. Jos, the state capital, is now divided into Christian and Muslim areas.
The obvious solution to many Westerners is secession: why don’t the Muslim north and the Christian south simply split? The reason is that African boundaries are not like European boundaries, which mostly make some sense–more so, after the ethnic cleansing at gunpoint we saw in the 1944-47 period. African boundaries are purely arbitrary, so once you open one to redrawing none are safe.
Staff Articles
Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947
by D.M. Giangreco
Naval Institute Press, 2009
ISBN-13: 978-1591143161
HC: 416 pages
$36.95 ($24.39 on Amazon here
)
This is two books woven together. The main theme as seen from the subtitle is a dissection of the command decisions leading up to the invasion plans for Japan and the detailed military reasons why Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not merely necessary but unavoidable. If this were still an issue subject to rational historical analysis and debate it would mark the effective end of the Revisionist critique that the bombs were aimed as a diplomatic statement to the Soviets.
Scott Palter Book Reviews
HMS Sheffield heavily damaged in 1982 (BBC/IWM)
The recent flare-up between Argentina and Britain has many observers, including the Belmont Club, reminiscing about the Falklands War of 1982.
Four facts intersect here.
First, no Western power has faced a serious naval challenge at sea since the battle of Okinawa in 1945. Naturally, this has meant a reduction in the number of available ships.
Second, the navies of the world have relentlessly sought gold-plated ship specifications. The result is sacrificing the number of hulls available for high-tech mirages.
Staff Articles
The Loyal Opposition (Reuters)
The Heritage Foundation convened a panel of foreign policy experts to discuss the Iranian regime, its nuclear program, and options for the West. Among them, Robert Kagan, whose remarks are bullet-pointed below:
- The Obama administration has done a “pretty good job” this year with respect to Iran–and “not entirely unintentionally.”
- Congressional Republicans are a “much more loyal, patriotic opposition” than were Congressional Democrats during President Bush’s tenure–and will be more willing to support a tough stance.
Staff Articles
Not the Greece of Yore
The euro was always a gamble: one currency but no control over what the member states did on fiscal matters. It was an acceptable gamble for the Rhine Five — Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg — but France pushed to get Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, etc., involved. Now, adding mini-versions of Germany like Austria wasn’t a problem, but the PIGS lacked the fiscal discipline not to ruin a good thing; essentially, they were too weak politically to force austerity on their populations. Everyone knew it but until you had a bust this fact could be hidden.
Scott Palter Articles
David Kilcullen
Some quick notes from Georgetown, where David Kilcullen has just addressed students and faculty at the Center for Peace and Security Studies. Highlights below:
- We’ve suffered from only incrementally increasing the number of troops over the years. The Taliban has proven itself capable of absorbing the impact from an additional 10-30 thousand troops. We need to either “overmatch” them with a substantially larger deployment or not send any at all (or possibly draw down).
Staff Articles
Terrorist target?
The World Food Program was hit in Pakistan by a suicide bomber earlier this week. As usual, Stratfor.com has churned out a long-winded analysis to explain why the NGO was targeted: it’s a “softer target,” small-scale attacks are “easy to conduct and require very few resources,” and NGO’s like the WFP are perceived to be allied with the US. All true, but the obvious reason is that NGO’s are favored by Western media organizations who play up the attacks. Thus, bombing a UN office (example) or a similar NGO facility (example)–or just killing their people (example)–will be taken as proof that the government has lost support because it cannot protect the capital, cannot protect a major city, cannot protect foreigners, and so on.
Staff Articles